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Researchers interested in the acoustic expression ofemotion usually assume that different individuals express the same emotions in similar ways. Yet, this has never been empirically demonstrated. Furthermore, there is no a priori theoretical reason why the acoustic expression of emotion must manifest crossculturally universal or even culturally shared but nonuniversal acoustic patterm. Emotionally charged vocal patterns could be idiosyncratic, requiring a period of acquaintance with the speaker to decode. This experiment was designed to address this issue by detecting the extent to which different individuals consistently produce similar constellations of awustic attributes in expressing a particular emotion.
Just as human and nonhuman primates share facial expressions of emotion (Jolly, 1972, pp. 158-159) , it is empirically likely that they share certain acoustic expressions of emotion. Shrieks of fear in chimps and in humans are likely to share high frequency due to muscles tensed for fight or flight (Scherer, 198 1 b) and high amplitude, as befits a call for help or a warning. Averaged acoustic measures, like mean fundamental frequency (Fo) and mean amplitude, are likely to uncover any such homologies and therefore be a source of interindividual similarity among humans.
As a call for help or warning of danger, the The acoustic analysis equipment used was paid for, in two shrieks also sharesome semantic ~oiecr: Wilhm EP " h n ' t kill me" nr "1 didn't do it" or "He did . .
to Alex" logically and grammatically entails both (a) 'bmeone spoke to Alex" and (b) "Jane spoke to someone," a speaker who believes the listener already knows that someone spoke to Alex will say "Jane spoke to Alex," whereas one who believes the listener already knows that Jane spoke to someone will say "Jane spoke to Alex" (Smith &Wilson, 1979, p. 154 ). The acoustic stress highlights which of the utterance's logicogrammatical entailments the speaker considers most important: It distinguishes "new" from "given" information (Bolinger, 1972; Clark & Clark, 1977, p. 32; Gunter, 1982; Hornby, 1972; Jones 1962, p. 108) . Essentially, acoustic stress can be a clue that allows the listener to select which interpretation the speaker intends.
Entailments are always derived by the a p plication of rules or procedures to a background of knowledge that the conversants are presumed 10 share. In linguistic and cognitive theories these rules are usually grammatical and/or logical, and they are applied to constituents of the utterance in relative isolation from contextual elements. For example, in the above case, (a) and (b) are grammatically specified by "Jane spoke to Alex" through the substitution of appropriate indefinite phrases at nodes of the sentence's phrase structure (Smith & Wilson, 1979, p. 159) . In the w e of lexical meaning, the propositional calculus is applied to the word's descriptors: Because "all uncles are men" is true by virtue of the lexical meaning of "uncle:' the sentence "my uncle spoke" deductively entails the proposition "A man spoke."
However, the highlighting of logically and grammatically derived entailments is often not sufficient for the interpretation of utterances. Since Bartlett (1932) , psychologists have acknowledged that context often plays a central role in linguistic interpretation. Although the study of contextual factors in language production and comprehension has been granted a subfield-"pragmatia"-little theoretical attention has been given to the types of procedural knowledge that mediate these factors. While researchers from Bartien to Schank and Abelson (1977) have posited that these procedures are represented in the fonn of rhemas or scriptsdomain specific inference struct un%-t hey have provided little insight into their specific content. Indeed, if such mipts are the product of idiosyncratic personal experiences, elucidating their content would be a pointless academic exercise.
Interestingly. recent developments in evolutionar) biolog) suggest that many emolron scripts are not idiosyncratic, that some of them lie at the core of what we think of as human nature. These dwelopments may provide some insight into the specific content of these inference procedures. Game theory. with its emphasis on the incentives and intentions of acton, lies at the heart of the current Darwtnian revolution in the undemanding of social behavior that has already hit anthropology and behavioral biology (cf. Hamilton. 1964; Williams. 1966; Maynard Smith. 1979; Dawkins, 1982; Triwrs, 1974; Popp & DeVore, 1979 : Chagnon & Irons 1979 Alcock, 1979) . These game theories provide reasonably specific hypotheses about the content of the inference procedures organisms use to reason about situations involving large fitness costs and benefits. Furthermore, they emphasize the importance of s~gnaling costs, benefits, and behavioral intenttons to conspecifics in negotiative interactions. Ethologists have traditionally considered such signaling the primary function of emotional expression, studying intention movements, courtship dances, agonistic displays. and aggressive interactions in mammals, birds, reptiles. fish, and insects.
Thus evolutionarily important contextsones involving sex, pair bonding, death. aggression, relatives, friendship, parenting. resource accrual-are likely to be emotional contexts, and are precisely the sort of domains for which one would expect humans to possess a variety of specialized, highly structured inference procedures. Such inference procedures would allow two or more conversants to derive relatively uniform contextdependent "entailments" of unerances in emotional situations. Acoustic stress may play a role in the interpretation of emotional speech similar to that proposed for grammatically derived entailments in nonemotional speech. Namely, acoustic stress might be used by a speaker to highlight which socioemotional "entailment" he or she intends. If this is the case, (a) emotional contexts are particularly likely to produce great conformity in stress patterns, and (b) even when the syntactic and semantic st'ruaure of an utterance is held constant, stress patterns should differ with emotional context. To see if this is true, one wants to look not only at averaged acoustic measures but also at ones that can vary with the words and relations expressed by the sentence's semantic structure.
Accordingly, the experiment reported in this article was designed to explore three questions: (a) Do different individuals consistently produce similar constellations of acoustic attributes in reading the same emotional passage? (b) Which are the consistent acoustic prop erties? (c) Are any of the consistent properties ones that vary with the words and relations expressed by the sentence's semantic structure?
Although theoretically oriented linguists have long hypothesized a relation between intonation and emotion (Bolinger, 1972 (Bolinger, , 1982 Gunter, 1982) , acoustic studies of emotion communication are rare. Averaged acoustic measures like mean Fo, amplitude, and tempo are thought to be associated with anger (Davitz, 1964; Huttar, 1968; Markel, Bein, & Phillips, 1973; Williams & Stevens, 1972) , benevolence and competence (Brown. Strong, & Rencher, 1973a , 1973b , depression (Markel et al., 1973) , confidence (Scherer, London, & Wolf, 1973) , deception (Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1976) , anxiety and stress (Hauser, 1976; Scherer, 198 la: Utsuki & Okamura, 1976) , fear (Fairbanks & Ronovost, 1939) . and grief (Davitz, 1964; Eldred & Rice, 1958; Hunar, 1968; Williams & Stevens, 1972) . The agreement among many of these studies argues that different individuals do produce standard configurations of acoustic attributes in expressing particular emotions. To demonstrate interindividual similarities decisively, across subjects is Williams and Stevens's (1972) work with three male acton. Althougb Williams and Stevens looked at a number of sophisticated acoustic variables, the only ones they quantitatively compared across subjects were mean and median Fo, FO span, and mean rate of articulation. Their comparison of spectrograms between subjects was qualitative, and they did not attempt to compare the Fo contours of different individuals.
In the experiment reported here, on two different occasions 1 1 subjects read a standard utterance, "I'll do it," which had been embedded in 10 different emotional contexts ("scenes"). I looked at six acoustic parameten of the "I'U do itWs, five of which could vary with the words and relations of the sentence's semantic structure. An acoustic emotion configuration (AEC) was defined as a constellation of acoustic attributes that is consistently produced by many individuals in expressing a particular emotion. I considered a parameter to contribute to an AEC if it varied with emotional context in a consistent, replicable manner across subjects. A quantitative scoring procedure that captures these criteria is presented in the Method section. My hypothesis was that the operation of the evolutionarily predicted inference procedures on the emotional scenes would structure subjects' acoustic responses. If this is true, a number of acoustic properties, including ones that vary with elements of semantic structure, should fulfill the scoring criteria, establishing the existence of AECs. The portions of the innructions to subjects relevant to lhis analysis are as follows:
Method
Thc purpow of lbis study is to learn about various Ming ishniques. In front of you there is a pile of rripts and a pile ofqumionnaircr. You will be playing m e of the cbypCtasin a h script and aomriog ~omt quations about your experience. At any point you can kave the experiment if you choose.
Tbe scripu arc numbered I thrwgh 10, and all but number 3 arc wrinm in the 6m person. You will play the cbarana who refers to her or himself as "I" in all reptition, but only the fist rendition was analyzed. The time required to acousticall) analyzc all three rcndiuons for each r e n c wwld have been prohibitive.
The tap recorded "I'll do it"s were analyzcd by the Fundamrntal Rriod (FPRD) program. which was devel- 
tinuous, so I mated ihc twoedwords as &e unit], and the duration of the spaa bctwecn '.'I'U and "&it"), a mawe of the trequency fall-rise panern, and a wssure of the amolitude fall-rise mnern (fall-rix mnerns diplay the relative variation o f i o or amplitude o%r the lrngth ofthe utterance). AU mrametm ex-I mean Fo (an PVQPBCd value) and total duration of u n a a n a can wry with aufaa elements of the sentence's semantic strunurc (Fo and amplitude fall-rise pattcrns are the most dnaiied mcprvrm of this &tion). For pnafyris of the m@e-nlued nontime ~arametm. the "I'U" and "doit" were each normalized for duration: they m each divided into 10 qua1 time segments and a mean Fo or ampl~tudc tnlim for each Xgmint. For fall-rise analyses the utIcranca me also norm a l i i for span on a IOpoint linear scale. An adhering to a single a~u s t i c fonn r c g d l e y of emotional context.
To dnamine (a) which sane3 are mvibuting to the dfa (b) wh*her the Pmuclic paramncr is high. middling or low for chov scena. and (c) ~~U I U rmny s a n s or jw a few rmcr arc varying thc s a n e eKect wrc dccompared into single dJcompuiums betwcm s a n e means through the U P of amUWs ( W i m 1971. p. 170) . BslW caPdaary o f e m o h u l expression is at iaue in this mtick, r set of contnrtr was considered d i d only if it yielded a r i g o i h t F ratio in both cocditiom (.'Y and "N-) and in a combined hr).way ANOVA with rrpotcd measures m both ~~CI CUS. w b the imsgcry manipulation is the second famr. The requirement that the wnVasts also prod u e a s i g n i h t clfecl in the Ovo-way ANOVA all-a in case w b inrpction of the maximal convasts in thc "I" and LN'' conditions suggests compting of cantmu for the two replications.
BeaUP this was M e~p h t w y
Study 10 See ~h e t h n I for an illustrative calcul;non T h~s normahation pro-there is an) msinene) at all in the acoustic expression cedure allows fall-nx mttcms to be considered maratel) of emotion, I dd not suvt out with hypotheses @ng from Fo span or amplitude ratio.
Intuitively. one would not want to say that AECs exist unless vocal responses to particular emotional contexts (in this case, different scenes) vary msinently across subjects. Vocal paramem that vary idiosyncratically across different subjects within a scene fail the msinency criterion. w h e r a ones that adhere 10 a single value or form regardless of emotional context are obviously not being uwd to express the different scenes' varying emotional contents. Both of thex possibilities are eliminated if the which m e means would be high, middling, or low. Although there wrc the constraint that convans in one r e p lication mirror t h w in the o t k , technically, they m e unplanned c o n t m~-c o n t r a n s derived by looking at the data (in facL "hypotheses" for the contmu m e derived by computing maximal contnrtr for the two-way ANOVA according to Winer, 1971.p. 176) . To avoid Type I errors an F m i o derived from unplanned convasts mun pass the more conservative ScheG ten (Wino. 1971, p. 198) . Although an Fderived from contrasts has only one dcgra TIME Figure 
where n is the number of subjects and I: the number of treatment groups.
Operationally. therefore, an acoustic parameter was considered to contribute to an AEC only if there was a ut of contrasts describing the variation of its m e means that p a d the Sche6 test for both replications and the combined wwwy ANOVA. As a further check on the validity of the scene mean diffmnrrs and to ue if there is any rcgu~arity to the p a n m of sane means for pmmctas that did not pass the nringmt Schcffe test. I also calculated Spearman correlations for the s a u e mean ranks for the tm, replications (Sicgel, 1956) .
The 20 values that connitute a fall-rise pattern must bc mndensed to one meaningful measure in order to apply thew criteria. Firsf a "mean shape" was computed for each s a n e by averaging all I I subjects' interval FO or amplitude values for the fun time t+&enf then the &nd, and so on for each of the 20 time segments (ret Figure 2 for a sample mean shape calculated from the fall-rise patterns of w o subjects). The relevant question for a mnfiguration analysis is as follom: Do subjects' fall-rise p tterns deviate randomly from this mean shirpe, or do thcy tend to adhere to it? To quantify this 1 computed a "deviation score'' for each subject's fall-rise panern. For each time segment the fall-rise panern's interval value was s u b tracted from the corresponding value for the mean shape for that scene. and the magnitudes (absolute values) of t h e deviations were summed (e.g.. the deviation xore for fall-rise pattern A in Figure 2 would be 19). The smaller the deviation score. thc closer thc fall-rise pancrn adheres to the scene mean shape. The ANOVAS described were run on these deviation scores.
For a fall-rise oattern to be said to varv cansinentlv . across subjects. ill scene mean deviation score should 6 l m r than a standard value representing deviations that M random uith respec. to m e . For comparison purposes. a ' m d a r d " score can be computed from a "grand mean shape"-a mean shape computed from the fall-rise patt m s of all subjsts in all r m e s in a session. The advantage of this shape as a standard is that it takes into account any global similarities common to all utterances. A deviation score from this grand mean shape can be computed for each fall-rire pattern. For each subject, the "grand mean" dcviation gores for each uvne are averaged. If it looks like all the s a n e mean deviation scores are low (indicating that uithin every r t n e subjects are producing very regular fall-rise patlcrns). thev grand mean &vialion scores can be included for comparison purports as an I ith l m l of the sane factor in the ANOVA. Olherwise, an a\-of thcv values can be used in constructing contrasts to decide which r m e mean deviation scores should be considered high. (This is how the grand mean deviation score was used in this experiment.)
If fall-rise patterns for cenain sanes are found to be regular, one wants to make sure they are not all the same shape: if they are, subjects are not using different fall-rise patterns to express different emotional contents. Scene mean shapes were compared pairwise through the mmputation of dcviation scores. Two shapes were considered "nry similar" iftheir deviation sore fell within u n f i d m a intervals set around the average deviation score for scmes ported if the variance of deviatim xors for thae matched saues is l o w than that for the "I" or " N diferent s a n e deviation scores. This assumption was tested using a h e mogcneity of variance t a t (Winer, 197 1, p. 38).
Finally. "reliability I" (1, The h i i e r it is for a particular acoustic parameter, the bener that parameter is at dirriminating among the ma (i.e., the more subjects are using that parameter to differentiate emotional contexts). Thus r , is useful for making rdaiw comparisons bctusm different acoustic parameters; the higher the r, for an acoustic parameter, the more imponant it is in creating AECs.
Results
Figure 3 is a scene by scene summary of the acoustic properties that fulfilled the AEC criteria and their associated contrasts. For mean F,, Fo span, and "doit" duration, a positive contrast indicates that the parameter was higher (or longer, for duration) than average for that scene, a zero contrast indicates that it was average, and a negative contrast indicates that it was lower (or shorter) than average. . falkrise contrast wU!S do not have "Irucue" the 3 power. Tbe ANOVAS were run on the mean shapes). (The shapes pictured are from transformed scores. The scene contrasts picwhichever condition produced the most reli-tured in Figure 3 The mean FO of an utterance was computed by taking the mean of the Fo values associated with the 20 time segments of the "I'll doit." Because the average mean Fo for males and females differ, 1 ran the analyses on scores that had bem standardized within subjects. The criterial R9. 90) value for the %he& test is 9 X F(9, 90), or 23.49 at the p < .O1 level, and 17.82 at the p < .05 level. The set of scene contrasts piaured in Figure 3 are significant at the p < .O1 level for the "I" condition, F(1, 90) = 57.89, the "N" condition, F(1, 90) = 52.24, and in the two-way ANOVA, F(1, 90) = 42.72. The imagery manipulation yielded no main effects or interactions in the two-way ANOVA: main effecf F(l , 10) = .34; interaction, F(9.90) = .55). The nonparametric Spearman test on ranks corroborates the conclusion that subjects are consistent in their application of different mean Fos to different emotional contexts; the correlation between ranks for the "I" and " N conditions is .82 (p < .005, onetailed). Mean Fo therefore fulfills the AEC criteria. For mean Fo, r, is .49.
Frequency Span
The Fo span of an utterance was computed by subtracting the lowest Fo value of the 20 segments from their highest value. Because scene variances were quite unequal for this parameter, I I did the nonparametric analog of the one-way ANOVA with repeated measures, the Friedman two-way ANOVA by ranks (Siegel, 1956, p. 166 ; "subjects" are the second factor). The Friedman chi-square (df = 9) was 28.13 for the "I" condition (p < .001) and 18.14 for the " N amdition (p < .05), indicating significant scene effects. Because these less ww&ndition, el, 96) = 22.56. The Spearman rank test on the transformed scores yielded a correlation of .71 ( p < .025, one-tailed). Thus Fo span fulfills the AEC criteria. The r, was .32. There were no dfects of the imagery manipulation: main eff'ect, F( 1, 10) = .14; interaction, F(9, 90) = .77).
Amplirude Ratio
The amplitude ratio was computed by dividing the highest amplitude reading for the 20 segments by the lowest. Division is more appropriate than subtraction for amplitude because the amplitude reading depends on the volume at which the tape is read into the computer, and low amplitude utterances have to be read in at higher volume to do the FPRD analysis. As in the Fo span parameter, the scene variances were quite unequal. The nonparametric Friedman test gave a chi-square (df = 9) of 13.29 for the "I" condition (not significant) and of 24.01 in the "N" condition (p < .01). The "I" results for this parameter thus fail one of the AEC criteria-that scenes vary from one another. A two-way ANOVA run on the untransformed scores shows a sianificant scene effect, F(9, 90) = 2.09, p ; .05, but not wen an F(l, 90) = 9.39 calculated from the maximal contrasts (those that will give the largest F ratio; see Winer, 197 1, p. 176) passes the %he% criterion. The Spearman rank correlation is .08 (ns), indicating that ranks in the "I" and " N conditions are uncorrelated. Amplitude ratio therefore fails to q,lnlifv as contributing to AECs. There were no main effects or interactions due to the imagery manipulation: main effect. F(1, 10) = .16; interaction, F(9, 90) = 1.48. erful tests showed pn effect, I transformed Fo ,.I'II,, Duraion spans (which had been standardized within subjects) to equalize their variances using a All durations are measured in 10,000ths of power derived from the slope of a log(mean) a second, which is the accuracy of the FPRD versus log(square root of variance) plot. An program. The two-way and " N condition Fo span score was transformed by adding 200 ANOVA on "I'U" durations yielded significant to its standard score and raising this value to scene effects, F(9, 90) = 3.00, 3.38, respec-tively. D < .01, but the "I" condition ANOVA "Doit" Duration showed no scene effect, F(9,90) = 1.01. This means the "I'll" duration parameter fails the AEC criteria. The fact that not even the maximal contrasts for the two-way ANOVA yield an F ratio that passes the ScheG test, F(1, 90) = 14.00, corroborates this conclusion. The two-way ANOVA showed no effects of the imagery manipulation: main effect, F(1, 10) = 1.02; interaction, F(9, 90) = .76. The Spearman test did yield a significant correlation between ranks for the "I" and "N conditions ( r~ = .77,p < .025 one-tailed). This suggests that "1' 11" duration is capable of varying with emotional context but that the effect is simply not strong enough for this particular choice of emotional scenes.
"Space" Duration All three ANOVAS yielded a significant scene effect for the '%pace" duration parameter: F(9, 90) = 4.20, p c .0l (two-way); F(9.90) = 5.43, p < .Ol ("I" condition); F(9, 90) = 2.35, p < .05 ("N" condition). The maximal contrasts from the two-way ANOVA, however, yield an F that is just barely significant with the Scheffe test at the .05 level, F(1, 90) = 19.22, and the integer contrasts they suggest (0, -1, -1, 0, +1,0, +1,0,0,O)donotpasstheScheffetest in the two-way analysis, F(1, 90) = 16.4. These contrasts do pass the Scheffe test in the "I" condition, F(1, 90) = 34.36, p c .01, and just miss the .05 level in the " N condition. In addition, the Spearman rank correlation is .77 (p c .025, one-tailed), indicating a correlation between ranks in the two conditions. There were no effects of the imagery manipulation: main effect, F(1, 10) = .54; interaction, F(9, 90) = 1.43).
Strictly speaking, this parameter does not pass the AEC criteria. Yet the many regularities that it does show suggest that scene effects are there, but they are a bit too weak to pass the stringent criteria. The ''space" duration varies around 100 msec, suggesting that it reflects the stop closure of the Id/ in "doit." The variation in results may be due to emphasis of the Id/ in "doit" (Stevens, Note 4); the fallrise pattern of Scene 7, for example, shows a spike in the firs interval of the "doit:' e m though the mean Fo and Fo span are lower than average for this scene.
The set of s a n e contrasts for "doit" pictured in Figure 3 yield an F(1, 90) of 35.34 in the "I" condition, 25.86 in the "N" condition, and 32.37 in the two-way ANOVA. AU three are significant at p < .01. Furthermore, the Spcarman rank comlation is .93 (p < .001, we-tailed), corroborating the ANWA results that indicate that the two conditions are highly correlated. The duration of "doit" therefore f u l a the AEC criteria There were no effects due to the imagery manipulation in the twoway analysis: main effect, F(1, 10) = .33; interaction, 9 9 , 90) = 1.71). The rdiabiity was .29.
Total Duration of Utterance
AU t h r e ANOVAS yielded sigDi6cant FS for h e scene factor. F(9,90) = 3.24, p < .01 (twoway); F(9,90) = 3.23, p < .O1 ("I" condition); 99,90) = 2.30, p < .05 ("N condition). The Spearman rank correlation was .83 (p < .005, one-tailed). However, not even the maximal contrasts for the two-way analysis passed the Scheffe test, F(1,90) = 14.79. This means that the total duration of utterance parameter does not pass the AEC criteria. The regularities may be due to the "doit" duration's contribution to the totals. For the "I" condition the correlation between ranks for "doit" and ranks for total duration is .64 (p < .05, one-tailed), for the "N condition, .73 (p < .025, onetailed).
Frequency Fa//-Rise Pattern
The scene contrasts for Fo fall-rise pictured in Figure 3 are significant at the p < .05 level for the two-way ANOVA, and at the p < .O1 level for the "I" and "N" conditions: F(1, 90) = 23.46, 25.1 1, and 31.46, respectively. These contrasts are supported by the Spearman results: Although the rank correlation is .55 (p < .I), the lack of correlation is due to Scene 2 adhering to the mean shape in the "I" condition but not the "N" condition. When Scene 2 is eliminated from the calculation, the rank correlation is .867 (p < .005, one-tailed). For Fo fall-rise, r , was .30. The Figure 3 contrasts indicate that subjects' individual fall-rise patterns were quite similar to the mean shapes for Scenes 3, 5, and 10, which are shown in Figure 3 . For Scenes 1, 2, 4, and 6, individual fall-rise patterns adhered somewhat to the scene mean shape, as the zero contrasts indicate. But tbe positive contmsts for Scenes 7, 8, and 9 suggest that these mean shapes are averages of a number of quite distinct fall-rise patterns. This conclusion is corroborated by the faa that the average deviation scores for these sana are quite similar to those h m a grand mean shape ' constructed from all the fall-rise patterns in a condition (see the Method section). Deviations from such a shape represent the maximum amount of deviation one can expect, given any p r e a common to all uttaanas.
The average deviation from the grand mean shape is 48 in the "I" condition--quite similar to the scores of 50.48, and 49 for Scenes 7, 8, and 9--and 47 in the "N condition-4m-ilar to the xxves of 45, 45, and 46 for these 3 scenes in the " N condition. One can see the operation of the averaging of diverse patterns in Scene 9. The situation involved a clinging and irritable mother who is unreasonably demanding things of her guilt-ridden adolescent child. It suggests two distinct emotional responses: irritated and de6ant or tired and resigned. Accordingly, individual fall-rise patterns split roughly in half, one set adhering to a shape like Scene 5's (defiant), the other to one like Scene 10's (resigned). Although the "I" and " N deviation scores for Scene 9 taken as a whole are quite high, the average deviations for the two sets considered separately are within the range considered low to medium by the ANOVA (L.I", 37 and 37 with low-medium averages of 32 and 39; " N , 32 and 30 with low-medium averages of 29 to 42). T h~s type of analysis allows some insight into how different people interpret and react to situations. Other scenes with high deviation scores did not seem to split naturally into two categories, suggesting that the situations portrayed iu them were not as easily categorized by the human emotional system. Not only did subjects tend to adhere to particular mean shapes, shapes for different s m e s differed from one another. Table 1 shows the 45 painvise deviation scores for mean shapes for both the "I" and " N conditions. The diagonal shows the matched scene scores. The Ptarson product-moment correlation between the "I" and " N condition matrices is .86 (p < .0005, one-tailed).
Provided the variance for the matched scene scores is lower than that for the "I" and " N matrices in Table 1 (see the Method section), a deviation score near the matched scene mean is the criterion for judging two mean shapes "wry similar." The variance requirement was met. The p < .05 cutoff for a homogeneity of variance test (Winer, 1971, p. 37) is A44, 9) = 2.89; the ("I" or " N variance)/(marched scene variance) ratio exceded this value for both conditions: "I", A44, 9) = 10.54; " N , F(44, 9) = 5.37. The mean matched scene score was 15, with a 95% upper confidence limit of 18.5 (df = 9). The average similarity of mean shapes was 33.73 for the "I" condition and 32.53 for the "N" condition. Because both are higher than the "very similar" cutoff of Table I h Table 1 . There were no effects of the imagery manipulation in the two-way ANOVA: main effect, F(1, 10) = .18; interaction, F(9, 90) = 1.40).
i m i o n Scoresfor Painvise Comparisons of Scene Mean Shapes

Amplitude Fall-Rise
Although the two-way and "N" condition ANOVAS yielded significant scene effects, F(9, 90) = 3.40,p< .Ol,F(9,90) = 2.66,p<.05, respectively, the "N" condition did not, F(9, 90) = 1.74 (ns). Not even the maximum contrasts for the two-way analysis pascd the SchefE test, F( 1,90) = 16.74. The Spearman rank correlation of .37 (m) also argues for a lack of consistency. The average deviations from the grand mean shape were 40 ("I") and 39 ("N"), lower thau the corresponding frequency fall-rise scores. This suggests that the lack of a sxne effect is due to a great s i n h i t y between different (scene) mean shapes. This view is supported by the fact that pairwise deviation scores for mean shapes were, on average, lower than for the Fo mean shapes ("I", 23.04; " N 23.62). These results suggest that, although amplitude fall-rise does show some interindividual regularity, it does not vary much with emotional context. Thus it does not contribute to an AEC in this experiment. The two-way ANOVA showed no effects of the imagery manipulation: main effect, F(1, 10) = .84; interaction, F(9, 90) = 1.19.
Summary
Four acoustic paramet-mean Fo, Fo span, "doit" duration, and Fo fall-rise pattern-met the AEC criteria. The reliability score for mean Fo was higher than those of the other three parameten, which were quite similar, suggesting that mean FO is one of the most consistently used parameters in the acoustic expression of emotion.
Discussion
Subjects tended to produce particular acoustic configurations in expressing particular emotions. Evidence for this claim is summarized in Figure 3 . Mean Fo. Fo span, FO fall-rise pattern, and "doit" duration all contributed to AECs. Other acoustic parameters either failed to vary with emotional context or their panern of variation was inconsistent from one trial to the next.
The e x h n c e of AECs is made all the more inmesting by the fact that the scenes were chosen to have complex and subtle emotional m a t e d that would be di5cult to label. S u b jects produced similar acoustic patterns in spite of the fact that the material did not lend itself to stereotypical conceptions.
Mean Fo was the only ''axmged" acoustic property to contribute to the AECs. The other three reflect varying emphasis on the words and relations of the sentence's semantic structure. For example, a large Fo span represents an increase in the magnitude of Fo variation over the duration of the sentence, the highest Fo values usually being asxtckted with stressed words (Cooper & Sorensen, 198 1, p. 17) . FO fall-rise, a property independent of the a b solute magnitude of the Fo span (because fallrise was normalized for span), specifies the changing directions of emphasis. Varying word duration, as reflected in the "doit" duration parameter, can be used to deemphasize or call attention to a word. Thus, speakers can use all three of these parameters to stress or underplay the words or relations in the sentence's semantic structure.
Three explanations haw been advanced in the linguistic and acoustic literature to account for the deployment of acoustic parameters that reflect changes in stress or emphasis over the course of the sentence: syntax (Bresnan, 197 1; Chomsky & Halle, 1968; Trager & Smith, 195 I), semantics (lehiste, 1970, p. 15 I; Smith &Wilson, 1979, p. 162) . and intentions (Bolinger, 1972 (Bolinger, , 1982 Pike, 1945, p. 21) . Although the role of syntax and semantics has been experimentally verified (cf. Cooper & Sorensen, 1981; Jones, 1962, p. 108) , that of intentions, which has occasionally been proposed in the linguistic literature (though not necessarily in the context of emotion communication), has not been tested acoustically. The experiment reported here was designed such that neither syntax nor semantics varied in the test sentences, so these facton cannot, even in principle, account for the variations produced. Consequently, the results demonstrate that there is at least one additional factor, aside from syntax and semantics, that is regulating speakers' use of awustic parameters reflecting stnss. Figure 3 shows that variations between AECs are a function of emotional context. The question then is, what is it about emotional context that can account for these between scene variations? Evolutionary biology provides meta-theoretical support for the n* tion that people share procedural knowledge for reasoning about emotional domains (see Introduction). Furthermore, it suggests that the enwding and decoding of intended courses of action is the primary function of emotion communication. Following this view, I will argue that emotions express the speaker's intentions and that in emotional speech, these intentions factor into the rules for mapping stress-related acoustic parameters onto the words and relations expressed by the sentence.
By intentions I mean the speaker's evaluative refarionship to aspects of the semantlc arucrure of the sentence acrually produced. If convemants share "emotion scripts"-procedural knowledge for making inferences about evolutionarilv crucial social domainsConsideration of Scenes 5 and 10 (see A p pendix) illustrates how an intentional explanation would explain some of the data of Figure 3 . Although the emotions aroused in Scene 5 are a complex jumble of anger, jealousy, insecurity, spite, and pride, the situation itself is, from an evolutionary point of view, a classic agonistic encounter. The speaker's ability to do certain actions bas been called into question by an older rival trying to assert bis dominance in front of his pem. He tries to publicly humiliate the speaker. To save face, the speaker must state emphatically that he intends to demonsrrau that his rival is wrong (that he can in fact "do it" and do it bater than his rihl). Accordingly, the mean Fo is high (making the utterance easy to hear), and the "doit" is emphasized over the "I'll" in the fall-rise pattern. Furthermore, it is emphasized strongly, as the very large Fo span indicates.
Although the high mean Fo and Fo span are consistent both with Williams and Stevens's (1972) and Fairbanks and Ronovost's (1939) findings for anger, and with Scherer, London, and Wolfs (1973) findings for dominance, knowledge of the vredominant emotion they will be able to &late information about aroused does not allow one to predict which the speaker's valuations into pred~c~ons about of the words is going to be emphasiizcd relative the speaker's intentions and their consequences. Thus the speaka's evaluative attitude toward the actions, state of being, or persons represented by the agent-action-object relations of the sentence's semantic structure embodies his or her behavioral intentions. "I'LL do it" said in a migned tone of voice does not simply mean that the actor will do the action, it means "I'll do it because I am too tired of fighting you about it, but if I could easily avoid doing it 1 would." "I'll DO it" said in an irritated, edgy tone of voice really means "I' 11 do it this time to get you off my back, but I'm getting fed up and might not do it next time." "I'LL do IT" said in a lilting tone, emphasizing the "I' ll:' means that the person is happy to do it, especially because it is you, whom he or she likes, who wants it done. Although semantic theories are usually adequate for representing what the speaker intends to say, they are not adequate for rep resenting factors controlling the paralinguistic communication of what the speaker intends to do about the state of affairs represented by the utterance.
to others (i.e., the fall-rise panem). This requires an understanding of the particulars of the situation and the specific behavioral intentions engendered by the speaker's valuation of those particulars. The game-theoretic logic of an agonistic encounter could allow you to predict that a speaker asserting dominance is going to use a large FO span (for special emphasis), a high mean Fo if he or she wants to be heard by all, and even which of the words or relations the speaker is likely to stms.
The logic of Scene 10 is almost opposite that of Scene 5. The speaker and his or her sister vacillate between guilt, shame, disgust, and revulsion. They are under the obligation of doing a revolting and guilt-provoking task, and one of the two must volunteer to "do it." Neither m t s to do it. Unlike Scene 5, there is no reason to emphasize the action itself, no audience to announce it to, no reason to shout. The salient thing to be communicated is the intention of the speaker to perform the act for his or ber sister, however reluctantly. As the low mean Fo indicates, the sentence is barely, reluctantly, said. Although the fall-rise pattern shows that the "l'll" is emphasized over the "doit," as one would expect in an offer, it is not emphasized much, as the middling Fo span indicates-after all, this is not an enthusiastic offer, but one of willingness in spite of unpleasantness. Most tellingly, the "doit"-the statement of the action that must be performed-trails off into a long, barely audible whisper. Again, although the work of W i s and Stevens and Fairbanks and Ronovost predicts low mean Fo and span for sorrow, they have no prdction regarding fall-rise pattern. Furthermore, although Scene 10 is clearly not a happy situation, it is not clear that it should be c o n s i d d "SOROWW' eithr, revulsion, guilt, disgust, and self-hatred are all prominent in this scene.
1 am not suggesting that no aspect of erne tional expression can be predicted by knowing a simple semantic descriptor of the speaker's emotional state. After all, certain emotional states are accompanied by general physiological reamons. Physiological correlates of erne tional states can alter the larynx and articulatory apparatus, and this, in him, can change vocal properties. For example, the copiousness and consistency of lubricating mucus in the larynx and of the rnucal Lining of the vocal folds during sexual arousal a&ts the efficiency of vibration in both men and women, making the voice more whispery and fme pitch control mom dificult (LPver & Trudgill, 1979). Sympathetic activation iu stressful circumstances deepens respiration, dilates t k b r d~, and increases musck &on, leading to incFesscd amplitude and fundamental frequency (Scherer, 198 la) . Such temporary physioi0g-ical changes in the state of the vocal apparatus that affect properties of entire utterances can be expected to produce cross-culturally invariant (or even primate-wide) characteristics of emotional communication.
But even here, a knowledge of the emotion descriptors will tell one nothing about the fallrise pattern, whereas an understanding of the game-theoretic nature of emotion-laden social interactions can predict which physiological changes in state will occur in which situations, in addition to predicting fall-rise pattern. For example, emotion scripts can suggest which situational parameters are likely to trigger the sympathetic activation of a "fight-flight" response and its cormponding acoustic correlates. Moreover, the same theoretical frame work, through the elucidation of the specific infmnce structures characteristic of emotion scripts, can also explain the types of stress patterns found in this experiment. Knowledge of an emotion descriptor cannot tell one both. Although this information-processing view of emotions in terms of procedural knowledge is biologically inspired, it is not a physiological theory of emotion. In fact, a physiological theory would have difficulty accounting for the acoustic data. If emotions are primarily transformations "of chemical or physical energy at the sensory output level into autonomic or motor output" (Zajonc, 1980, p. 154) or expaienced somatic reactions in the JamesLange tradition (James, 1890)-ii emotional expression in humans is the product of general inchoate experiences or preferences like "feeling angry" or "feeling sad"-unstructured by the cognitive appraisals emphasized by some psychologists (e.g, Lararus, 1982)-one would expect acoustic emotion communication to consist only of acoustic parameters that reflect temporary physiological changes in the vocal apparatus. One would not predict that acoustic parameters rdecting differential stress patterns would be major contributors to AECs, as found in this experiment. And the mapping of acoustic properties onto a list of simple emotion descriptors would be a relatively trivial matter.
Yet linguists have not been able to construct systematic rules for assigning stres in emotion speech (Bolinger, 1972 (Bolinger, , 1982 Lieberman, 1%7, pp. 121-1 22) . Moreover, the somatictype view cannot even account for the highly situation-spccihc, though s k r e o m acoustic patterns used by nonhuman primates. Vervet monkeys, for example, have three different alarm calls for their three most dangerous predators: snakes, birds of prey, and predatory cats (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980) . Clearly the effecu of one autonomic state (due to a "flight-fight" reaction) cannot account for the existence of three distinct acoustic patterns. However, the evolutionary, game-thee retic, emotion-scripts view of emotion expression as intention expression can not only accouw for (a) the importance of stress patterns in emotion speech, (b) the existence of situ- stress. Furthermore, the use of similar inference procedures predicts great uniformity in subjects' stress patterns for a particular emotional situation. On this view, a one-to-one mapping of acoustic properties onto a list of simple emotions would be misguided because stress patterns depend on how the particulars of the situation feed into the emotion script.
For example, I could create a situation where you were just as "angry" as the speaker in Scene 5, by arb~trarily and cruelly deciding to let someone else do something you really want to do. Presumably, you would shout "I'LL do it," produnng a fall-rise pattern with emphasis on the "I'll" rather than on the "doit:' as in Scene 5. Thus the intentional view would explain the difficulty linguists have had in finding systematic rules for assigning stress in emotion speech. Furthermore, in cases where it is important for highly social, though nonlinguistic species, like nonhuman primates, to differentiate situations that may engender the same autonomic response (such that acoustic correlates of autonomic response are not sufficiently informative), the intentional view predicts the existence of regular, differentiated acoustic patterns for expressing the different situation-specific information. The i n t e n t i d view stresses the importance of expressing not only the relations between words, as generative semantics, for example, already does, but also the speaker's valuing of SON OF EMOTION those relations and the actions the) represent. As currently construed, semantic theories cannot represent this intenuonal information such that it can be readily incorporated into a performance model of AEC production. Schank's (1972) conceptual dependency model and Fillmore's (1968) case grammar, for example, use semantic representations in which relations are internally defined, that is, defined between classes of words or "ideas" that function similarly. However, their approaches do not capture the evaluative relationship the speaker has to these agent-action-object relationships. A conceptual dependency or case grammar representation of "I'll do it" does not tell how the speakerjkls about doing itdoes he or she want to or not, will he or she do it in the future or not, does he or she consider doing it to & a positive benefit or a way of avoiding unwanted coits, and so on. Not tven Schlesingr's (1971) "intentional grammar" expresses this relationship. His "I-marke n , ' ' like the base structures in generative semantin, specify the relations between elements (thereby expressing what the speaker intended lo saj~), but contain no evaluative position explicating the speaker's beha~fioral intentions regarding the actions, people, or states being discussed.
At least three types of representations (plus emotion-script processing systems) could embody such evaluative information:
1. Semantic representations like Schank's or Fillmore's could be fed through an "emotion processor" that evaluates the intensions expressed by the representation so intentional acoustic markers can be appropriately assigned. This seems like putting the cart before the horse, however. After all, the speaker's emotional attitude toward the referent of the utterance is often part of the reason he or she wants to make the statement in the 6nt place Therefore, from the perspective of a performance model, it would be odd to assign emotion values after the decision regarding what to say has been made.
2. Evaluations could be represented as propositions separate from the agent-actionobject relations of the sentence actually uttered. A "'grammatical" transformation would then be applied, superimposing acoustic patterns corresponding to the evaluative p r w -sitiens on the utterance expressing the central 3. The relations between agent, action, and object in the underlying semantic representation could be labeled with the &s evaluations of them. intonational rules for producing the acoustic configurations would be applied accordingly. In this system, motivational factors are an integral part of the semantic representation. Assume the representation of "I'll do it" is as in a case grammar.
If I said it in response to the hundredth request you made today, the agent relation (corresponding to "I") might be labeled with a negative evaluation and emphasized, but not the verb or object because what I object to is the fact that I am doing anything at all for you, regardless of what it is I am doing. On the other hand, if said in reply to a request to clean up vomit, the verb might be labeled negatively and emphasized because it is the process of doing the action rather than the fact of who I'm doing it for or the resulting state (having the floor clean-the referent of "it") that is unpleasant. This system captures the fact that it is often specific words that are emphaslzed in particular ways, a convenient property for a performance model.
The discovery that different individuals adhere to reasonably specific acoustic patterns in expressing different emotions promises to add a new dimension to the study of language. These panerns cannot be explained by current syntactic or semantic theories. Interpreting them in terms of the speaker's valuing of the relations, persons, actions, or entities represented in the sentence, that is, in terms of the speaker's intentions, opens the way for the reconciliation of two views of language: language as a formal system of rules, and language as an evolutionary adaptation. If the relation between emotion and language is pursued, this reconciliation may take the form of a theory of intenuonal generative semantics. I kept up my foolishness for the laughter's sake, laughing with them, for after those two long nighu of dance and moonlight and music and magery I was in a fey and wild mood, ready for whatwa might come.
Jasper, who never laughed aloud, looked at me. "I am sick of boys and noise and f o o l i s h n~" he $aid.
"You're getting middle-aged, lad," Vetch remarked from above.
"If silence and gloom is what you want," put in one of the younger boys, "you could always try the Tower." 1 said to him, "What is it you want, then, JasprT' "I want the company of my equals," Jasper said.
"Come on, Vetch. Leave the prmtias to their toys."
I turned to face Jasper. "What do sohave that prentim lack?" I inquired. My voice was quiet, but all the other boys suddenly fell still, for in my voice. as in Jasper's the spite between us now sounded plain and clear as steel coming out of a sheath. "Power? Jasper said. "I'll match your power act for act." "You challenge me?" "1 challenge you." Vetch had dropped down to the ground, and now he came between u r grim of face. "Duels in sorcery are forbidden to us, and well you know it. Let this cease!" Both Jasper and I stool silent, for it's true that w knew the law of Roke, and we also knew that Vnch was moved by love, and ourselves by hate. Yet our anger was balked, not cooled. Presently, moving a little aside as if to be heard by Vetch alone. Jasper spoke, with his cool smile: "I think you'd better remind your goatherd friend again of the law that protects him. He looks sulky. I wonder, did he really think I'd accept a challenge from him? a fellow who smells of goats, a prentice who doesn't know the F i t Change?" "Jasper," said I, "What do you know of what I know?"
For an instant, with no word spoken that any heard, I vanished from their sight. and whae I had stood a great falcon hovered, opening irs hoolred teak to scream: for one instant, and then I stood again in the nickering torchlight, my dark gaze on Jasper.
Jasper had taken a step backward, in astonishment: but now he shrugged and said one word: "Illusion."
The others muttered. Vetch said, "That was not illusion. It was true change. And enough. Jasper, listen-" At that, Vetch turned from Jasper, and said very softly to me, "Sparrowhawk. will you be a man and drop this now--come with me-" I looked at my friend and smiled. but said nothing. "Now," I said to Jasper, quietly as before, "'what arc you going to do to prove yourself my superior, Jasper?" "I don't have to do anything, Goatherd. Yet I will. 1 will give you a chance-an opportunity. Envy eats you like a worm in an apple. Let's out the worm. Once by Roke Knoll you boasted that Gontish vizards don't play games. Come to Roke Knoll now and show us what it is they do instead. And afterward, maybe I will show you a little sorcery." "Yes, I should like to see that:' I anwred, cooly.
"What would you like me to do. Jasper?"
The older lad shrugged, "Summon up a spirit from the dead, for all 1 care!" "I will." "You will not." Jasper looked straight at me. rage suddenly naming out over his disda~n. "You will not. You cannot. You brag and brag-" "By my name, [I'll do it!]" Script 102
There is a city called Omelas. How can I tell you about the people of Omelas? We have almost lost hold; We can no longer describe a happy man, nor make any celebration of joy. But in Omelai . . . The festival of summer! A marvelous smell of cooking goes forth from the red and blue tents of the provisioners. The faces of small children are amiably sticky: in the benign grey beard of a man a couple of crumbs of rich pastry are entangled. The youths and girls have mounted their horses and are begtnning to group around the starting line of the race course. An old woman, small, fat, and laughing, is passing out flowers from a basket, and 
